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Trial Practice and Procedure
by C. Frederick Overby*

Jason Crawford**
Teresa T. Abell"*
and
Matthew E. Cook****

I.

INTRODUCTION

This survey period yielded several notable decisions covering the
professional malpractice affidavit/pleading requirement, renewal actions,
attorney-client relations, and the summary judgment standard.

Refinements in the areas of insurance practice, jury qualifications,
releases, default judgment, and privileges lend important guidance to
practitioners, judges, and scholars in the area of trial practice and
procedure. The most significant legislative development of trial practice
and procedure addressed the longstanding "vanishing venue" doctrine.

* Partner in the firm of Butler, Wooten, Overby, Fryhofer, Daughtery & Sullivan,
Columbus and Atlanta, Georgia. Georgia Southwestern State University (B.S., 1981);
Walter F. George School of Law, Mercer University (J.D., 1984). Member, State Bars of
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** Associate in the firm of Butler, Wooten, Overby, Fryhofer, Daughtery & Sullivan,
Columbus and Atlanta, Georgia. Georgia State University (B.B.A., magna cum laude,
1990); University of Georgia (J.D., magna cum laude, 1993). Member, State Bar of
Georgia.
*** Associate in the firm of Butler, Wooten, Overby, Fryhofer, Daughtery & Sullivan,
Columbus and Atlanta, Georgia. Columbus State University (B.A., summa cum laude,
1991); Walter F. George School of Law, Mercer University (J.D., magna cum laude, 1995).
Member, State Bar of Georgia.
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Columbus and Atlanta, Georgia. Piedmont College (B.A., 1996); Walter F. George School
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CASE LAW

A. The ProfessionalNegligence PleadingRequirement of O.C.G.A.
section 9-11-9.1
As usual, the most frequently litigated area during the survey period
was the professional negligence pleading requirement of O.C.G.A. section
9-11-9.1, a statute passed with the promise that it would reduce
unnecessary litigation in malpractice cases. Trial practitioners are
indeed fortunate that this statute exists to diminish litigation if the
litigation prompted by this statute is any indication of this pressing
need.
The case of Phoebe Putney Memorial Hospital v. Skipper' provides a
telling example of the litigation boom spawned by O.C.G.A. section 9-119.1.2 The pleading requirement issue was addressed at every level up
to the supreme court and then re-addressed on remand by the court of
appeals. In the last leg of the marathon litigation, focusing almost
exclusively on plaintiff's pleading proficiency, the court of appeals held
the lack of a valid jurat on the affidavit renders the affidavit voidable
but not void, such that an original, properly executed affidavit can be
substituted before the trial court's ruling on the defendant's motion to
dismiss in order to save the claim.'
The 1997 amendments to the statute liberalizing the requirements and
softening the penalty for noncompliance did not apply in Skipper, but
"since the Supreme Court construed the amendment as an affirmation
of legislative intent already implied, that intent [was] honored in
construing the former version."4 If the amended version had applied,
however, subsection (d) would have expressly saved the claim under the
facts of the case because it allows a plaintiff to cure a defective
affidavit.' Comparing the holdings of Skipper and Davis v. Kaiser
FoundationHealth Plan of Georgia, Inc.,' a case discussed elsewhere in
this Article in connection with reimbursement claims made by healthcare insurance providers, one can only guess when a legislative
enactment is presumed to change existing law and when it is deemed to
be an affirmation of existing legislative intent or public policy. The
cases provide no clear answer.

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

235 Ga. App. 534, 510 S.E.2d 101 (1998).
O.C.G.A. § 9-11-9.1 (1993).
235 Ga. App. at 534-37, 510 S.E.2d at 102-05.
Id. at 534 n.4, 510 S.E.2d at 103 n.4.
O.C.G.A. § 9-11-9.1(d) (1993 & Supp. 1999).
235 Ga. App. 13, 508 S.E.2d 431 (1998).
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Harrisv. Murray7 makes clear that the 1997 amendments to O.C.G.A.
section 9-11-9.1 do not apply retroactively, despite the statute's being
deemed "procedural," as opposed to "substantive."' The legislature is
free to prescribe only prospective application for even a procedural
statute, which is what it did with respect to the 1997 amendments 9
The court of appeals in Harrisalso held that an affidavit is no less an
affidavit because the witness was not formally administered an oath at
the time and place of execution."0
It is not necessary that the oath administered be formal, nor is it
necessary that any exact words or specific ceremony be used to
constitute a valid administration of an oath. "What the law requires
is that there must be, in the presence of the officer, something done
whereby the person to be bound consciously takes upon himself the
obligation of an oath.""
This holding is not only in accord with age-old case law cited by the
majority opinion, but is also consistent with the practices of real world
notary publics everywhere. If the law were suddenly to require some
formal, ceremonial administration of an oath, as suggested by Judge
Andrews in his dissent urging dismissal of plaintiff's case for lack of
ceremony, most affidavits around the state would become nullities,
creating perhaps even more unnecessary litigation than O.C.G.A. section
9_11_9.1.12

Another intriguing question recently decided by the court of appeals
is whether a malpractice suit is void, or merely voidable, because the
affiant in deposition is unable to confirm the acts of negligence to which
he testified in his initial malpractice affidavit filed contemporaneously

7. 233 Ga. App. 661, 504 S.E.2d 736 (1998).
8. Id. at 662-63, 504 S.E.2d at 738-39.
9. Id. at 662, 504 S.E.2d at 738. This reasoning makes logical sense, for although it
has long been the law that the General Assembly cannot prescribe the retroactive
application of a substantive law, the converse has never been true: the General Assembly
has always been free to provide for prospective application only of a procedural law. Id.
(citing Pritchard v. Savannah St. R.R. 87 Ga. 294, 13 S.E. 493 (1891); Slaughter v.
Culpepper, 35 Ga. 25 (1866)). To rule otherwise would foreclose the legislature from ever
determining when an enactment is to be prospective only, and when it is to be retroactive.
Under that scenario, if the legislation were substantive, its application could only be
prospective; if the legislation were procedural, it could only be retroactive. The law has

never been so restrictive in this area.
10. Id. at 664, 504 S.E.2d at 740.
11. Id. (quoting McCain v. Bonner, 122 Ga. 842, 846, 51 S.E. 36, 38 (1905)) (citations
omitted).

12. Id. at 669, 504 S.E.2d at 742.
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with the complaint.' 3 For if the suit is a nullity, then it cannot 14be
dismissed and refiled successfully under Georgia's Renewal Statute.
In Sawyer v. DeKalb Medical Center, Inc.," the court of appeals
decided this issue, which was inspired by O.C.G.A. section 9-11-9.1. In
that case, plaintiff's medical affiant, Dr. Bryant, apparently drew a
blank when asked about the hospital's negligence in his deposition.
Plaintiff dismissed her case and refiled within six months pursuant to
O.C.G.A. section 9-2-61, the Renewal Statute, attaching the affidavit of
a different, presumably less forgetful physician.' 6 The court held that
the initial suit was merely voidable because the first affidavit, as filed,
was admittedly sufficient in and of itself and because objections to the
plaintiff's failure to comply with O.C.G.A. section 9-11-9.1 could be
Such a determination comports with the policy of the
waived.' 7
Georgia Civil Practice Act that requires the court to liberally construe
pleadings, including malpractice affidavits, in favor of the pleader, "so
long as such construction does not detract from the purpose of section 911-9.1 of reducing the number of frivolous malpractice suits." 8
The Renewal Statute

B.

What is a plaintiff's lawyer to do if he properly sues the tortfeasor in
a case arising from a motor vehicle collision only to find out after the
expiration of the statute of limitations that the liability insurer is
insolvent? The answer to this question was reaffirmed this survey
period: dismiss and refile under O.C.G.A. section 9-2-61, the Renewal
Statute. The case that paved the way for this successful tactic is Stout
v. CincinnatiInsurance Co.'9
In Stout the Supreme Court of Georgia reaffirmed the principle that
service upon an uninsured or underinsured motorist carrier is not the
same as the service required to make an entity a party to the underlying
tort action, but is, instead, merely a vehicle to provide notice of the
existence of a lawsuit in which the insurer may ultimately be held
financially responsible.2" It is the validity of the service of the underlying lawsuit on the defendant which ultimately controls. 2' Otherwise,
an insurance company that is not a party to the lawsuit would be

13.
14.

See Sawyer v. DeKalb Med. Ctr., Inc., 234 Ga. App. 54, 506 S.E.2d 197 (1998).
See O.C.G.A. § 9-2-61 (1982 & Supp. 1999).

15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.

234 Ga. App. 54, 506 S.E.2d 197 (1998).
Id. at 54, 506 S.E.2d at 198.
Id. at 55-57, 506 S.E.2d at 199-200.
Id. at 56-57, 506 S.E.2d at 200.
269 Ga. 611, 502 S.E.2d 226 (1998).
Id. at 611-12, 502 S.E.2d at 227.
Id. at 612, 502 S.E.2d at 227.
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permitted to assert a defense not even available to the defendant.2 2
Therefore, service upon an uninsured or underinsured motorist carrier
is valid if it would be valid upon the defendant in the case.
The holding in Stout eliminates the harsh results that would otherwise
befall a plaintiff who discovers the insolvency of the liability insurer only
after the expiration of the statute of limitations by providing such
plaintiff with an escape hatch. Still, under this law a plaintiff is forced
to execute a number of seemingly pointless machinations-she must
dismiss a valid action against a properly served defendant and refile the
action, serving the same defendant again along with the insurance
carrier. This exercise seems unnecessary in light of the late Justice
Weltner's suggestion in the case of Bohannon v. J.C. Penney Casualty
Insurance Co.,' echoed by Justice Fletcher in his special concurrence
in Stout,24 that under such circumstances the plaintiff ought to be
allowed "to serve the [uninsured motorist] carrier 'as soon as reasonably
possible after becoming aware, by whatever means, that there is
substantive doubt as to the existence of adequate insurance coverage of
an event that might become the subject of an uninsured motorist
claim.'"2"
C. Summary Judgment Standard in "Slip and Fall" Cases
During the most recent survey period, one thing has become crystal
clear to the plaintiffs' and defense's bars: the lower courts have taken
the supreme court's admonition in Robinson v. Kroger Co.26 quite
seriously. In that landmark opinion, analyzed in detail last survey
period,27 the supreme court brought the standard for granting summary
judgment in slip and fall cases back in line with the standard applied in
negligence cases generally.28 During the most recent survey period,
cases that in previous years would have been doomed to summary
judgment are suddenly viable as a matter of law. In fact, this survey

22. Id.
23. 259 Ga. 162, 163-64, 377 S.E.2d 853, 853-54 (1989) (Weltner, J., dissenting).
24. 269 Ga. at 613-14, 502 S.E.2d at 228 (Fletcher, J., concurring specially).
25. Id. at 613, 502 S.E.2d at 228 (citing Bohannon v. J.C. Penney Cas. Ins. Co., 259 Ga.
at 163-64, 377 S.E.2d at 853-54). Both the holding of the majority in Stout and the
Weltner/Fletcher approach eliminate the harshness of denying uninsured motorist benefits
to one who has paid premiums for those benefits and yet discovered the applicability of the
coverage past the expiration of the statute of limitations. The Weltner/Fletcher approach
advocates a simpler, less technical way of accomplishing the same thing.
26. 268 Ga. 735, 493 S.E.2d 403 (1997).
27. C. Frederick Overby et al., Trial Practiceand Procedure, 50 MERCER L. REV. 359,
360 (1998).
28. 268 Ga. at 748-49, 493 S.E.2d at 413-14.
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period marks the return of a near-extinct species of appellate opinion-the reversal of a trial court for grantingsummary judgment in slip
and fall cases.
One prime example of the havoc wreaked by Robinson on the hopes for
summary judgment harbored by premises owners is the case of Flournoy
v. Hospital Authority of Houston County.29 In that case, citing the
supreme court's statement that "the 'routine' issues of premises liability,
i.e., the negligence of the defendant and the plaintiff, and the plaintiff's
lack of ordinary care for personal safety[,] are generally not susceptible
of summary adjudication," ° the court of appeals reversed the trial
court's grant of summary judgment.3 Setting up a stark contrast
between pre- and post-Robinson slip and fall law, the court overruled the
case of Manley v. Gwinnett Place Associates,3 2 a case that barred a
plaintiff from recovery as a matter of law because she was able to
appreciate the hazardous condition on the premises. 33 In Flournoy the
court (1) deferred to the jury as to issues of negligence, and (2) refused
to require plaintiff to disprove his own negligence before defendant
established negligence on the part of plaintiff.34 The result was a
reversal of the trial court's grant of summary judgment in a slip and fall
case.

35

Further proof that timing is indeed everything if you bring or defend
a slip and fall case is provided by Laffoday v. Winn Dixie Atlanta, Inc.36
In that case, Judge Andrews reversed the grant of summary judgment
in a slip and fall case because, according to Judge Andrews, "'appellate
courts must apply the law as it exists at the time of the appellate court's
judgment, even though doing so might change the judgment of the trial
court which was correct at the time it was rendered."'3 7 In other words,
according to Judge Andrews, the trial court correctly granted summary
judgment based on the law as it existed at the time of the ruling.3"
However, the law had changed, via Robinson, before the court of appeals
had rendered its decision, and thus, required reversal. 9 Ms. Laffoday's
29. 232 Ga. App. 791, 504 S.E.2d 198 (1998).
30. Id. at 792, 504 S.E.2d at 199 (citing Robinson v. Kroger Co., 268 Ga. at 748, 493
S.E.2d at 414).
31. Id. at 793, 504 S.E.2d at 200.
32. 216 Ga. App. 379, 454 S.E.2d 577 (1995).
33. Id. at 381-82, 454 S.E.2d at 579-80.
34. 232 Ga. App. at 792-93, 504 S.E.2d at 199-200.
35. Id. at 793, 504 S.E.2d at 199.
36. 235 Ga. App. 832, 510 S.E.2d 598 (1998).
37. Id. at 834, 510 S.E.2d at 599 (quoting Sharfuddin v. Drug Emporium, 230 Ga. App.
679, 498 S.E.2d 748 (1998)).
38. Id.
39. Id., 510 S.E.2d at 599-600.
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admission in her deposition that she had not been concentrating upon
each footfall before her fall would have been fatal pre-Robinson, while
post-Robinson, it was only a factor for the jury to consider in making its
liability determination.'
Yet another reversal of a grant of summary judgment in a slip and fall
case occurred in Sutton v. Winn Dixie Stores, Inc. 41 In Sutton plaintiff

slipped and fell upon entering a grocery store after coming in from a
heavy downpour. The owner of the premises had actual knowledge of
the slick entryway to the store based on evidence that employees had
been ordered to mop the entryway every five minutes, to place a yellow
warning sign in the area, and to install a rubber safety mat for patrons
to walk across as they entered the building. 42 Although there is no
duty to continuously mop or warn of potential accumulations during a
downpour, the voluntary undertaking by the store triggered a duty to
perform the undertaken tasks with ordinary care. 43 Although plaintiff
had mere constructive knowledge of the hazard--obviously plaintiff was
aware it was raining outside-the court could not say as a matter of law
plaintiff failed to exercise ordinary care to avoid the danger.' Under
pre-Robinson case law, plaintiff's constructive knowledge would have
foreclosed recovery, removing from the jury its ability to determine
under the facts whether the premises owner's actual knowledge was
"superior" to the invitee's constructive knowledge.
D. Attorney-Client Relations
In Zielinski v. Clorox Co., 45 the supreme court adopted the federal

test for determining when an attorney-client relationship exists between
a corporate employee and that corporation's legal counsel.46 In
Zielinski plaintiff brought suit against Clorox and one of its employee
supervisors, alleging a claim against the supervisor for tortious
interference with employment. At trial plaintiff sought to impeach the
supervisor with statements the supervisor made at a meeting with
corporate counsel and several other Clorox employees to discuss how to
handle an investigation of plaintiff concerning an alleged embezzlement
scheme. A transcript of the meeting was provided to a district attorney
by Clorox. The trial court held an attorney-client privilege existed

40. Id.

41. 233 Ga. App. 424, 504 S.E.2d 245 (1998).
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.

Id. at 424-25, 504 S.E.2d at 246-47.
Id. at 425, 504 S.E.2d at 247.
Id. at 427-28, 504 S.E.2d at 249.
270 Ga. 38, 504 S.E.2d 683 (1998).
Id. at 41, 504 S.E.2d at 686.
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between the supervisor and corporate counsel and the privilege was not
waived with regard to the employee by Clorox's forwarding of the
transcript to the district attorney.4 7 The supreme court disagreed and
adopted the federal test for determining whether an attorney-client
relationship existed between the employee and corporate counsel, stating
that an employee asserting the privilege has the burden of proving that
such privilege exists.48 The court, quoting United States v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters,49 held:
First, [employees who seek to assert the privilege] must show they
approached [counsel] for the purpose of seeking legal advice. Second,
they must demonstrate that when they approached [counsel] they made
it clear that they were seeking legal advice in their individual rather
than in their representative capacities. Third, they must demonstrate
that the [counsel] saw fit to communicate with them in their individual
capacities, knowing that a possible conflict could arise. Fourth, they
must prove that their conversations with [counsel] were confidential.
And, fifth, they must show that the substance of their conversations
with [counsel] did not concern matters within the company or the
general affairs of the company.6 0
The court held the supervisor had not established an attorney-client
privilege under the test because, among other things, his communications with corporate counsel were made in the presence of other
employees and the statements made to counsel concerned the corporation's affairs. 51
In a decision with potentially far reaching implications in the legal
malpractice context, the court of appeals refused to recognize a lost
opportunity cause of action in favor of clients who are prejudiced by
failure of their attorney to file a timely appeal and refused to ease the
virtually insurmountable burden a plaintiff faces in such legal malpractice cases. In Dow Chemical Co. v. Ogletree, Deakins, Nash, Smoak &
Stewart," the court of appeals reaffirmed the near impossible standard
of proof that clients face when bringing a legal malpractice action
against their attorney(s) for failure to file a timely appeal.5 3 Specifically, to establish that the attorney's negligence was the proximate cause
of the client's injury, an aggrieved client must show that had an appeal

47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.

Id. at 38-39, 504 S.E.2d at 684-85.
Id. at 40-41, 504 S.E.2d at 685-86.
119 F.3d 210, 215 (2d Cir. 1997).
270 Ga. at 41, 504 S.E.2d at 686.
Id. at 41-42, 504 S.E.2d at 686.
237 Ga. App. 27, 514 S.E.2d 836 (1999).
Id. at 29, 514 S.E.2d at 839.
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been filed, the trial court decision would have been overturned and the
appellate decision would have been in the client's favor.14 It would
logically follow that the next unstated, but surely looming step in one's
proof would be a showing that the client's position would have been
subsequently improved on retrial after remittitur to the trial court.
In the underlying case giving rise to the alleged malpractice, Dow
Chemical was sued in the federal district court in the Northern District
of Georgia for its alleged negligence in maintenance of coagulation ponds
and the subsequent damage resulting to plaintiffs' neighboring property.
The jury returned a verdict against Dow awarding plaintiffs $450,000 in
compensatory and $2 million in punitive damages. Judgment was
entered on the verdict January 29, 1990. Ogletree obtained an order
from the district court extending the ten day time period for the filing
of post trial motions to March 8, 1990. After a denial of Dow's motion
for judgment notwithstanding verdict ("JNOV") or a new trial, Dow filed
a notice of appeal with the Eleventh Circuit. The Eleventh Circuit
rejected the appeal as untimely, holding the district court lacked the
authority to extend the ten day period for the filing of post trial motions,
and therefore, Dow's failure to file its notice of appeal within thirty days
of the entry of judgment was untimely. As a result, Dow filed a
malpractice action against Ogletree. The trial court granted Ogletree's
motion for summary judgment with respect to the issue of whether
Ogletree could be held liable for failure to file a timely appeal.5 5 The
court of appeals affirmed, holding the burden remained on the client to
show an appeal would have been successful if filed. 6
Two notable problems with the decision are apparent. The first is the
nature of the proof that a plaintiff must provide a court in Dow's
situation. In legal malpractice cases involving the failure to appeal,
according to the court, the issue of proximate cause is for the court to
decide and not the jury, unlike any other malpractice case, indeed,
unlike any other negligence case.57 The court in Ogletree wrote, "[tihe
question of whether an appeal would have been successful is a question
of law, exclusively within the province of judges.""5 The court explained
that the question is for the court and precludes the use of expert
testimony.59 In Ogletree plaintiff presented the affidavit of a former

54.

Id.

55. Id. at 28-29, 514 S.E.2d 838-39.
56. Id. at 29, 514 S.E.2d at 839.

57. Id.
58. Id. at 30, 514 S.E.2d at 840 (quoting Hipple v. Brick, 202 Ga. App. 571, 415 S.E.2d
182 (1992)).

59. Id.
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United States district court judge in which the former judge gave his
opinion that an appeal to the Eleventh Circuit, timely filed, would likely
have resulted in the $2 million punitive award being overturned.60 The
court wrote that Dow's assertion that the affidavit should have been
considered by the trial court was "without merit."6 1 The court held it
would be error for a court to rely upon the opinion of an expert in
making the determination regarding how a court would rule on an
appeal.62
Deciding proximate cause as a question of law in legal malpractice
cases is wholly at odds with the way the issue is handled in all other
malpractice cases and in all other negligence cases." Generally, the
trier of fact is to make the decision regarding the proximate cause of a
plaintiff's injury, aided by the testimony of experts. At the summary
judgment stage, because proximate cause is so clearly a factual question,
the Georgia Civil Practice Act requires not only consideration of the
nonmovant's expert affidavit, but deference to that testimony and all
favorable inferences that can be drawn therefrom." 4 Though it may be
difficult for a jury or expert to decide what a panel of judges would likely
have done, the task seems no less complex for one court to predict how
another court would have ruled on appeal or for a medical expert to
opine about the probability of a different medical outcome.
Additionally, it seems the court carved out an exception to the
professional negligence pleading requirement, O.C.G.A. section 9-11-9.1,
by refusing to allow expert affidavits regarding proximate cause in legal
malpractice cases. 5 That statute specifically requires an affidavit from
an attorney in order to initiate a viable malpractice action, and during
this survey period, the court of appeals ruled that a malpractice action
brought subject to section 9-11-9.1 must be dismissed absent proof
likelihood that the alleged
contained in the initial affidavit "'of the
6
negligence caused the injury or death.'"
The second problem with the decision stems from the court's rejection
of the client's argument for the adoption of a "'lost opportunity' standard,

60.

Id., 514 S.E.2d at 839.

61. Id.
62. Id., 514 S.E.2d at 840.
63. See, e.g., Lincoln County v. Edmond, 231 Ga. App. 871, 875, 501 S.E.2d 38, 42
(1998); Pace v. M.E. Hunter & Assoc., 195 Ga. App. 23, 25, 392 S.E.2d 545, 548 (1990).
64. See O.C.G.A. § 9-11-56 (1993). See also Vizzini v. Blonder, 165 Ga. App. 840, 303
S.E.2d 38, 39 (1983).
65. See 237 Ga. App. at 30, 514 S.E.2d at 839-40.
66. Patterson v. Fulton-DeKalb Hosp. Auth., 233 Ga. App. 706, 708, 505 S.E.2d 232,
234 (1998) (citing Abdul-Majeed v. Emory Univ. Hosp., 225 Ga. App. 608, 609, 484 S.E.2d
257, 259 (1997)).
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under which a plaintiff may sue its attorney for the lost opportunity to
appeal, without regard to whether the appeal would have been
successful."67 The court wrote, "[iut is possible that the mere filing of
an appeal, although meritless, could create uncertainty in the mind of
the appellee and thus induce him to settle [and] failure to file such an
appeal could damage the appellant by depriving him of the opportunity
to settle."6s The court refused to consider the "lost opportunity"
standard for legal malpractice cases, however, pointing out that "Dow's
brief fail[ed] to mention any evidence showing that it was in fact
damaged by such lost opportunity in this case."6 9 However, the court
indicated that such an argument would not prevail even had Dow
presented evidence of damage resulting from the lost opportunity to
appeal, stating "it is highly questionable whether such speculative
damages can properly serve as the basis for a malpractice action."7 °
The court went on to conclude that "'[flailure to file an appeal which
would be unsuccessful on the merits or frivolous would not harm the
losing litigant but instead would save the litigant time, money, and
anguish.'"' From this opinion, one must conclude that the client was
apparently ungrateful to its attorney, whose violation of the standard of
care was presumably in the client's best interest.
The court's concluding remarks seem to ignore two critical points: (1)
that mechanisms, such as sanctions, exist to prevent truly frivolous
appeals, and (2) though the damages to the plaintiff may be hard to
compute, that fact alone does not necessarily render them speculative.
The court glossed over the very real effect that the filing of an appeal
has on settlement negotiations, particularly where the jury verdict is
large and ii composed primarily of punitive damages.72 A jury could
just as well apply its "enlightened conscience" to the determination of
damages in a legal malpractice lost opportunity case as in other areas
where it is asked to do the same. Computing damages in a lost
opportunity case would be no more ephemeral than computing damages
for pain and suffering, loss of consortium, or punitive damages, all of
which courts entrust to the enlightened conscience of an impartial
73

jury.

67.
68.
69.
70.
71.

237 Ga. App. at 29, 514 S.E.2d at 839.
Id. at 29-30, 514 S.E.2d at 839.
Id. at 30, 514 S.E.2d at 839.
Id.
Id. (quoting McMann v. Mockler, 233 Ga. App. 279, 281, 503 S.E.2d 894 (1998)).

72. Id. at 29-30, 514 S.E.2d at 839.
73. See, e.g., Hospital Auth. of Gwinnett County v. Jones, 259 Ga. 759, 760-61, 386
S.E.2d 120, 122-23 (1989) (amount of punitive damages measured by enlightened

conscience of jury), rev'd on other grounds, 499 U.S. 914; Turpin v. Worley, 206 Ga. App.
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In Holland v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.,7 4 the

court of appeals found an attorney's lien for fees superior to that of a
hospital or of the Department of Medical Assistance ("DMA"). 75 In
Holland an automobile accident victim was treated at the Floyd Medical
Center ("FMC"). DMA asserted a lien on Mr. Holland's claim for
recovery against the driver of the automobile in which Mr. Holland had
been a passenger. Likewise, the hospital asserted a lien for the amount
of medical bills in excess of the Medicaid payments made by DMA.
State Farm brought an interpleader action to determine the priority of
liens asserted against the insurance proceeds, and subsequently,
Holland's attorney asserted a lien in Holland's motion for reconsideration, after the trial court had found liens in favor of DMA and FMC.76
The trial court held the attorney's lien was not timely asserted and the
lien for attorney fees was subject to the liens asserted by DMA and
FMC.77 The court of appeals reversed the trial court, holding that the
attorney's lien was not ripe until an award was made by the trial court,
which, in this case, was the award of the liens to DMA and FMC.78
The court held, therefore, that the assertion of the lien in the motion for
reconsideration was timely.79 Moreover, the court wrote that the liens
in favor of DMA and FMC, pursuant to O.C.G.A. sections 49-4-149o
and 44-14-470,1 were, by their plain language, subject to an attorney's
lien for fees. 2 So, under Georgia law practitioners are advised that
some liens, apparently, are inherently better than others.
Calling for the supreme court to overrule old case precedent, the court
of appeals reluctantly held an attorney's lien time barred, applying the
four year statute of limitations for suit on an open account to an
attorney's lien on real property in Jones v. Wellon. 5 In that case,
plaintiff brought an action to quiet title and to remove a lien placed on
plaintiff's real estate by his former attorney, pursuant to O.C.G.A.
section 15-19-14(c). 8 4 The court held that because the attorney failed
to bring suit to enforce the lien against the real property within the four
341, 343, 425 S.E.2d 895, 898 (1993) (amount of damages for pain and suffering measured
by enlightened conscience of jury).
74. 236 Ga. App. 832, 513 S.E.2d 48 (1999).
75. Id. at 834, 513 S.E.2d at 50.
76. Id. at 833-34, 513 S.E.2d at 49-50.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 834, 513 S.E.2d at 50.
79. Id.
80. O.C.G.A. § 49-4-149 (1998).
81. Id. § 44-14-470 (1982).
82. 236 Ga. App. at 834, 513 S.E.2d at 50.
83. 237 Ga. App. 62, 514 S.E.2d 880 (1999).
84. Id. at 62, 514 S.E.2d at 881.
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year statute of limitations mandated for suit on an open account,
enforcement of the debt was barred and, likewise, the lien was extinguished."s
The court of appeals criticized the 1941 supreme court precedent that
constrained it to make the decision in Jones:
The ramification of the law as it now stands under Johnson is that
attorneys are prompted to sue their clients at the earliest opportunity
to receive their fees. The unfortunate bottom line is that attorneys are
encouraged to sacrifice the ethical and moral ideals embodied in the
lawyer-client relationship in order to protect their economic livelihood.8"
The court pointed out that the supreme court's decision in Johnson v.
Giraud,s7 which relied upon Peavy v. Thrner,ss was decided at a time
when attorney liens were grouped in the Code with liens generally, and
thus, were subject to being foreclosed within the time period prescribed
in the general lien statute.8 9
The court criticized the decision in Johnson for failing to recognize
what the court of appeals believed was the clear intention of the General
Assembly in removing the attorney's lien statute from the general lien
section in the Code, namely, to remove any time restriction for foreclosure of an attorney's lien.9 ° The court wrote, "[tihis segregation of the
attorney lien indicates an intent by the legislature that it be treated as
a special remedy for attorneys, separate and distinct from other
remedies created under the Code."9 The court of appeals was referring
to the fact that the statute governing attorney liens on real property,
O.C.G.A. section 15-19-14,92 is separate and not subject to the time
limitations placed on other liens against real property, such as the
materialman's lien of O.C.G.A. section 44-14-361, 9' which requires
commencement of an action within 12 months from the date a claim
becomes due and owing. Moreover, the court pointed out, although an

85. Id. at 66, 514 S.E.2d at 883.
86. Id. While the court's statement is surely valid, the authors believe that real world
experience, unfortunately, reveals at least as much opportunity for abuse of the attorneyclient relationship by the improper utilization of attorney liens as with the improper filing

of lawsuits on open account.
87. 191 Ga. 577, 13 S.E.2d 365 (1941).
88. 107 Ga. 401, 33 S.E. 409 (1899).
89. 237 Ga. App. at 66, 514 S.E.2d at 883.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 65, 514 S.E.2d at 883.
92. O.C.G.A. § 15-19-14 (1999).
93. Id. § 44-14-361 (1982).
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attorney's lien against a client's personal property under O.C.G.A.
section 15-19-15 specifically provides a fixed time period within which
the liens must be satisfied, the legislature failed to make a lien against
real property under O.C.G.A. section 15-19-14 subject to any time
provision.94 The court expounded, "[cilearly, if the legislature had
intended for attorney liens on real property to be governed by the
procedures set forth under Title 44, it would have explicitly provided
therefor, as it did for liens covered by OCGA [section] 15-19-15."9'
Though the court advanced four arguments against imposition of a
statute of limitations upon the foreclosure of an attorney's lien against
real property, the policy behind such unique treatment is difficult to
understand. The court admirably decried the fact that "attorneys are
prompted to sue their clients at the earliest opportunity to receive their
fees [and thus] are encouraged to sacrifice the ethical and moral ideals
embodied in the lawyer-client relationship in order to protect their
economic livelihood."98 The court nonetheless failed to explain the
"ethical and moral" superiority of placing a lien against a client's
property and waiting for the "ethical and moral" time to foreclose, as
opposed to the filing of a lawsuit on open account.
E.

Jury Qualifications

Switzer v. Gorman97 presented two interesting questions for the court
of appeals. First, the court upheld the trial court's refusal to strike a
juror for cause in a medical malpractice case, when the juror stated he
and his wife had been patients of defendant doctor for about ten
years. 8 During voir dire, plaintiff's counsel asked the juror whether
his relationship with defendant-doctor would cause the juror to "'lean to'
the doctor's side or give Dr. Gorman the benefit of the doubt," to which
the juror replied affirmatively. The juror further answered plaintiff's
counsel that he "probably" would be unable to render a true verdict in
the case due to his knowledge of the defendant.' 0 The trial judge then
asked the juror, "could you base your verdict in this case solely upon the
sworn testimony of witnesses who testify and the law that I give you in
charge and.., on the law as I have said and put any personal feelings

94.

237 Ga. App. at 65, 514 S.E.2d at 882.

95. Id.
96.
97.

Id. at 66, 514 S.E.2d at 883.
235 Ga. App. 794, 510 S.E.2d 581 (1998).

98. Id at 795, 510 S.E.2d at 581.
99. Id., 510 S.E.2d at 581-82.
100. Id., 510 S.E.2d at 581.
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that you might have aside?"" 1 The juror then answered he could, and
the court qualified the juror. °2
The court of appeals found no abuse of the trial court's discretion for
refusing to strike the juror for cause when it was not established that
the juror had an opinion "so fixed and definite that it would not be
changed by the evidence or the charge of the court upon the evidence." 103 It is important to note that while the court wrote that the
existence of a doctor-patient relationship between a juror and party
would not justify removing the discretion of the trial court,' 4 the court
did not hold that it would have been an abuse of discretion to have
removed the juror for cause. In other words, a trial court would be free
to remove a juror for cause based upon the juror's doctor-patient
relationship with a defendant doctor. So the posture of the case reveals
nothing more than no per se disqualification based on the doctor-patient
relationship exists.
The Switzer opinion involved a second issue which seems to be a
troubling development in Georgia law. The issue arose in the context of
the cross-examination of defendant's expert regarding the appropriate
standard of care.0 5 The court held it was not an appropriate method
of impeachment for an attorney to cross-examine the expert on the
course of treatment the expert would personally have undertaken for the
patient. 0 6 The court's decision was solidly supported by Georgia
precedent.0 7 Nonetheless, careful analysis leads one to question the
soundness of the precedent foreclosing this line of questioning. In
Georgia courts, parties have
the right to a thorough and sifting cross-examination [that] extends to
all matters, relevant and material to the controversy, within the
knowledge of the witness. The purpose of cross-examination is to
provide a searching test of the intelligence, memory, accuracy, and
veracity of the witnesses, and it is better for cross-examination to be
too free than too much restricted.' 8
The relevance and importance of a medical expert's personal choice of
a course of treatment is highly probative of the credibility of the expert's
opinion concerning the standard of care. A jury is free to disregard the

101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.

Id., 510 S.E.2d at 582.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 795-96, 510 S.E.2d at 582.
Id. at 796, 510 S.E.2d at 582.
Id. (citing Brannen v. Prince, 204 Ga. App. 866, 421 S.E.2d 76 (1992)).
Thomas v. Baxter, 234 Ga. App. 663, 666-67, 507 S.E.2d 766, 770 (1998).
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expert's opinion entirely and find that the standard of care is reflected
by the course of treatment the expert would have chosen, a highly
probable scenario if other evidence admitted in the case supports this
proposition. For example, assume two courses of treatment are used in
the medical community, course "A"and course "B." Further assume that
course "B" has five times the survival rate of course "A." If the
defendant doctor has chosen course "A" and hires an expert who
personally always follows course "B," but will testify that course "A"
meets the standard of care, the jury will be aided by revelation of this
point on cross-examination, because it is free to disregard the expert's
opinion as to the standard of care. Permitting the expert to be crossexamined on a personal choice regarding course of treatment and why
it would be different than the defendant-doctor allows a full examination
of the expert's opinion on standard of care and the basis therefor.
Another case involving the qualifying of jurors was Wallace v.Swift
Spinning Mills, Inc.,' °9 wherein plaintiff sought to have jurors qualified regarding an insurance company, its parent corporation, and its
sister entities."0 In Swift the court of appeals held that failure to
qualify jurors with respect to their relationships with insurers, that are
not insurers of parties to the suit, does not create a presumption of
harmful error "absent an affirmative showing to the trial court by the
proponent of such qualification that there is a strong probability that
insurance companies that are not insurers of the parties have a direct,
demonstrable financial stake in the outcome of the case.""' In Swift
defendant was insured by American Motorist Insurance Company, which
plaintiff alleged was a subsidiary, sister, or otherwise related corporation
to four other insurance companies. The trial court refused plaintiff's
demand to qualify the jurors as to the other four insurance companies.
After a verdict for defendant, plaintiff appealed, arguing the trial court's
refusal to qualify jurors as to their relationship with the other four
insurers created a presumption of harmful error." 2 The court of
appeals affirmed the trial court because plaintiff failed to provide any
proof of the financial relationship between American Motorist and the
other four insurers which would tend to show that the "'subsidiaries' had
any financial interest in the case or that they would be affected in any
way by the outcome" of the case."'

109.
110.
111.
112.
113.

236 Ga. App. 613, 511 S.E.2d 904 (1999).
Id. at 614, 511 S.E.2d at 905-06.
Id. at 615, 511 S.E.2d at 906.
Id. at 613-14, 511 S.E.2d at 905-06.
Id. at 616, 511 S.E.2d at 907 (internal quotations supplied by court).
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In a footnote, the court outlined what showing would be required to
establish a direct financial interest among insurance companies, such
that qualification of the jury panel would be required as to subsidiary
corporations who are not insurers of the parties in the case."" Once
a plaintiff has discovered the identity of the defendant's insurer
pursuant to O.C.G.A. section 15-19-7:
[P]laintiff would have to put up certified records from the Insurance
Commissioner or industry publications showing the financial relationship between an insurer and any other insurance company to demonstrate a direct financial stake in the case. If the insurer is not a
corporation but a partnership, joint venture, cooperative, trust, or
association that acts as an insurer under a trade name, then each
entity that has a financial stake in the insurer should be qualified.
Plaintiff must show the identity and nature of the insurer, which
demonstrates the financial interest as insurer. The nature of the
insurer may be demonstrated by Insurance Commissioner records of
qualification and financial ability, trade publications, partnership
registration, trade name registrations, or any other evidence that
would prove the nature of the insurer."5
In Swift plaintiff argued the insurance companies were all related
through a parent corporation, Kemper National Insurance Company."'
The court rejected plaintiff's argument because plaintiff failed to
establish the relationship with affirmative proof. 17 The court wrote
that if plaintiff had "shown that the insurer was the name of a division
of a parent corporation and that such division had no separate corporate
entity, the trial court would have to qualify the jury," and likewise, "if
the real entity was a corporation operating under a number of trade
names," the court would have to qualify the jury."8 As the court
noted, it may "be extremely difficult ...

to find jurors who are not

subject to disqualification due to a prohibited relationship with any of
the subsidiaries of large corporation," but nevertheless, where a plaintiff
can show a common financial interest in the outcome of a suit among the
companies, qualification of the jurors is required." 9
Accordingly, the court of appeals has given clear guidance to attorneys
preparing to prove the financial connection and relatedness of insurers
during voir dire if they seek to have the jury panel qualified as to other

114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 616 n.6, 511 S.E.2d at 907 n.6.
at 617, 511 S.E.2d at 907.
at 616 n.7, 511 S.E.2d at 907 n.7.
at 615, 511 S.E.2d at 906-07.
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entities related in some respect to the insurers of parties. It would
appear that something more than a parent-subsidiary or sibling
corporate relationship is required.

F Discovery Practice
Addressing an issue of first impression, the court of appeals brought
Georgia in line with the federal rules regarding authentication of
documents.

In Davis v. Healthcare Corp.,2 ' defendant produced

plaintiff's medication record in response to plaintiff's request for
production of documents, and in defendant's written response, defendant
stated that "[tihe medication sheets on [plaintiff] during her stay at the
Defendant's facility are attached." 2 ' The document in dispute was an
order purportedly made by the facility's physician concerning plaintiff's
care while at defendant's facility.'22 Typically medical records are
authenticated by certification of an attendant of the records. However,
the court wrote that the Georgia "rules of evidence provide a wide
variety of means by which a party may authenticate a writing," and
"[tihe use of circumstantial evidence is one of these methods."'23 The
court held "that while possession, standing alone, cannot authenticate
a document, possession, together with other circumstances [] may."' 24
The court found the "other circumstances" required to authenticate a
document were its content and appearance.'2 5 In addition to the
production of the document by defendant in discovery and denoted
therein as the "medication sheet" of plaintiff, defendant, in brief to the
court, did not deny the authenticity of the document but only argued
plaintiff had not carried the burden of authenticating a document
defendant had produced.' 26 Additionally, the circumstantial evidence
relied upon by the court showed the document listed the patient and her
doctor, the medication plaintiff was receiving during her stay, and the
room number in which she was placed while in defendant's facility.'27
The court held these circumstances coupled with defendant's possession
of the medication record was sufficient to establish the authenticity of
the document." 2 This holding obviates the peculiar dilemma a party
previously faced when a document was produced by the opposing party,

120.
121.
122.
123.

234 Ga. App. 744, 507
Id. at 747, 507 S.E.2d
Id. at 744, 507 S.E.2d
Id. at 746, 507 S.E.2d

S.E.2d 563 (1998).
at 566 (internal quotations omitted).
at 564.
at 565 (internal quotations omitted).

124. Id. at 747, 507 S.E.2d at 566.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 747 n.3, 507 S.E.2d at 566 n.3.
127. Id. at 747-48, 507 S.E.2d at 566.
128. Id. at 748, 507 S.E.2d at 567.
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who should have had more knowledge concerning the origin of the
document than the receiving party, but who nevertheless refused to
admit to the authenticity of the document. By considering possession of
the document as a prominent factor in authentication, the dilemma is
eased substantially. The court seems to be moving in the direction of a
common sense rule, shifting the burden to the party that produces
evidence in discovery to demonstrate that the evidence is not authentic
when that evidence was created by the same party.
The issue of privilege was addressed in Price v. State Farm Mutual
Automobile Insurance Co.'29 by the court of appeals during the survey
period and bears mentioning for the warning contained therein for
practitioners desiring to assert privilege, claims. The case arose as a
result of an automobile wreck. Plaintiff sued defendant Engleman for
negligence and negligent infliction of emotional distress. The uninsured
motorist carrier, State Farm, was also served with a copy of the
complaint. State Farm then served plaintiff and his treating psychiatrist with a request for production of the psychiatrist's treatment records
and bills for plaintiff. Plaintiff and the psychiatrist did not file an
objection to the request within ten days pursuant to O.C.G.A. section 911-34(c)(2). 130 When State Farm moved to compel the records, plaintiff
filed a response asserting the records were protected from discovery by
the psychiatrist-patient privilege. The trial court subsequently
granted
31
State Farm's motion to compel production of the records.'
The court of appeals pointed out it previously held that a trial court
abused its discretion when it failed to grant a motion to compel records
from a plaintiff's dentist when no objection was filed within the ten-day
period under O.C.G.A. section 9-11-34(c)(2).' 32 The court held plaintiff's "belated assertion of the psychiatrist-patient privilege in this case
[did] not demand a different result.' 33 The court of appeals stated the
psychiatrist-patient privilege can be waived:

129. 235 Ga. App. 792, 510 S.E.2d 582 (1998).
130. O.C.G.A. section 9-11-34(c)(2) provides in pertinent part:
The nonparty, any party, or the person whose records are sought may file an
objection with the court in which the action is pending and shall serve a copy of
such objection on the nonparty to whom the request is directed, who shall not
furnish the requested materials until further order of the court ....
If no
objection is filed within ten days of the request, the nonparty to whom the request
is directed shall promptly comply therewith.
131. 235 Ga. App. at 792, 510 S.E.2d at 583.
132. Id. at 793, 510 S.E.2d at 583 (citing McFarlin v. Taylor, 187 Ga. App. 54, 55, 369
S.E.2d 330, 331 (1988)).
133. Id., 510 S.E.2d at 583-84.
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Since it is well-established that a party's failure to timely object to a
discovery request will result in a waiver of the right to object, we find
that [plaintiff's] failure to object within ten days resulted in a waiver
of his right to object to [defendant's] discovery request based upon the
psychiatrist-patient privilege.13 '
G.

Insurance/CompleteCompensation Rule

Although the Legislature codified the complete compensation rule in
1997 and proclaimed that insurers are not free to avoid the rule by
specifically-crafted contractual language, cases were nonetheless decided
during this survey period under the law as it existed prior to the
enactment of O.C.G.A. section 33-24-56.1.13" Such cases are controlled
by the supreme court's decision in the pivotal case of Duncan v. Integon
General Insurance Corp.,36 in which the highest court declared the
complete compensation rule is the public policy of the State of Georgia."' The supreme court declined to address whether or not an
insurer is free to override that public policy by specific contractual
language because the policy at issue in Duncan was silent on the
matter. 13' Therefore, any purported ruling on the matter would have
been dicta. The court of appeals took the opportunity during the survey
period to flesh out the answer that the supreme court left open in
Duncan.
In Davis v. Kaiser Foundation Health Plan of Georgia, Inc.," 9 the
court of appeals held prior to the statutory codification of the complete
compensation rule, insurers were free to avoid the complete compensation rule and Georgia's public policy by express contractual language
contained in the insurance policy.140
This decision is somewhat
troubling for several reasons.
First, the supreme court made clear in Duncan that the complete
compensation rule is the public policy of the State of Georgia-so much
so that the supreme court held the requirement would be engrafted as
a matter of law onto any insurance contract that did not expressly
stipulate otherwise."'
Because the complete compensation rule is
clearly the public policy of this state, it is unprecedented that insurers

134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.

Id. at 793-94, 510 S.E.2d at 584.
O.C.G.A. § 33-24-56.1 (1992).
267 Ga. 646, 482 S.E.2d 325 (1997).
Id. at 647, 482 S.E.2d at 326.
Id. at 647-48, 482 S.E.2d at 326-27.
235 Ga. App. 13, 508 S.E.2d 431 (1998).
Id. at 14-15, 508 S.E.2d at 432.
267 Ga. at 647, 482 S.E.2d at 326.
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would be given the ability to override Georgia public policy by the terms
of an adhesion contract.
Second, the reasoning offered by Judge Andrews in support of the
holding is somewhat suspect. Judge Andrews cited one's general
freedom to contract and that by passing O.C.G.A. section 33-24-56.1
codifying the complete compensation rule, the Legislature intended to
Although one is generally free to contract as
change existing law."
he or she pleases, that freedom must yield if "the General Assembly has
declared [that the provision is contrary to public policy]" or if "the
consideration of the contract is contrary to good morals and contrary to
Both the General Assembly and the supreme court declared
law.""
the complete compensation rule to be the public policy of the state.
O.C.G.A. section 33-24-56.1, through all of its procedural and substantive codification of the complete compensation rule surely changed the
law, but it clearly did not change the State's public policy in favor of the
complete compensation rule. In fact, the statute seems to have been
prompted by that very public policy and a desire to ensure substantive
and procedural fairness to all parties.
In Jefferson-Pilot Insurance Co. v. Fraker,'" another case in which
O.C.G.A. section 33-24-56.1 is inapplicable, the court of appeals refused
to enforce an insurance policy provision which required the insured to
pay over to the insurer one-third of any "recovery made... by way of
judgment, settlement, or otherwise" received by the plaintiff or his
dependant as a result of any action brought on account of injuries
arising from any incident in which the plaintiff's insurer had paid
medical expenses on behalf of the insured. 45 The policy required such
payment without regard to whether the insured was first completely
compensated for his injuries."" The court relied upon the bright-line
47
rule created in Duncan v. Integon General Insurance Corp., that an
injured person be fully compensated for her injuries before an insurer
has a right of reimbursement, absent clear contract language to the
Thus, the court held a provision in an insurance policy
contrary."
will not be upheld when it does not specifically indicate the insurer's

142. 235 Ga. App. at 15, 508 S.E.2d at 432.
143. Department of Transp. v. Brooks, 254 Ga. 303, 312, 328 S.E.2d 705, 713 (1985).
144. 234 Ga. App. 430, 507 S.E.2d 188 (1998).
145. Id. at 433, 507 S.E.2d at 190-91.
146. Id. at 431-32, 507 S.E.2d at 190. In Jefferson.Pilotboth the execution of the policy
and the injury sustained by plaintiff occurred prior to the enactment of O.C.G.A. section
33-24-56.1 which "prohibits reimbursement provisions unless the insured is first completely
compensated," and therefore, the state was inapplicable. Id.
147. 267 Ga. 646, 482 S.E.2d 325 (1997).
148. 234 Ga. App. at 431, 507 S.E.2d at 189-90.
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right of reimbursement applies even in the event an insured is not
completely compensated.149

Holland v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 1 ° a case
discussed earlier in this Article for its prioritizing of attorney liens, is of
further interest to practitioners who are interested in addressing the
claim for reimbursement for medical expenses paid by the Department
of Medical Assistance ("DMA") or medical services provided by a medical
service provider, such as a hospital. In Holland the court rejected
plaintiff's argument for an extension of the complete compensation rule
which bars claims of reimbursement asserted by private insurers unless
and until the injured person has been completely compensated for all
injuries received.'
The court refused to apply the rule to an entity
that has not received premiums from the injured party.'52
The ruling accords with O.C.G.A. section 33-24-56.1, the statutory
codification of the complete compensation rule, with respect to the
O.C.G.A. section 33-24-56.1(1)
DMA's claim for reimbursement.
specifically exempts reimbursement claims made by the Department of
Community Health from the complete compensation rule.'53 The court
of appeals did not address this argument.
Insurance/BadFaith
In Metropolitan Property & Casualty Insurance Co. v. Crump," the
court of appeals held that a judgment creditor lacked standing to bring
a garnishment action against a tortfeasor's insurer for bad faith refusal
or negligent failure to settle a claim.'55 In Crump plaintiff, who had
acquired a judgment in excess of the tortfeasor's liability insurance
policy limits, sought to garnish the tortfeasor's potential action for bad
Essentially,
faith against Metropolitan, the tortfeasor's insurer. 5
plaintiff tried an indirect approach to what is clearly prohibited by
Georgia law, that is, to recover a judgment in excess of the policy limits
of the tortfeasor's liability insurance policy directly from the insurer.
The court wrote that, "[iut is well established that a claimant in an

H.

149. Id. at 433, 507 S.E.2d at 190.
150. 236 Ga. App. 832, 513 S.E.2d 48 (1999).
151. Id. at 834, 513 S.E.2d at 50.
152. Id.
153. O.C.G.A. § 33-24-56.1(1) (1992) provides that the complete compensation rule "shall
not apply to the rights of the Department of Community Health to recover under Article
7 of Chapter 4 of Title 49, nor shall it affect the subrogation rights and obligations provided
in Code Section 34-9-11.1 [the workers' compensation subrogation statute]."
154. 237 Ga. App. 96, 513 S.E.2d 33 (1999).
155. Id. at 96, 513 S.E.2d at 33.
156. Id., 513 S.E.2d at 34.
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automobile collision case has no 'employment, contractual, or other
relationship' with the other driver's liability insurer," and thus, "may not
maintain [an] action against other motorist's liability insurer for failure
to settle within policy limits."'57 Not only is there no relationship
between the insurer and the injured third-party such that the insurer
may be liable to a third-party for negligence or bad faith in handling the
claim, but a "'defendant in a tort action is not subject to garnishment
until the tort claim is reduced to judgment.'"'58 Essentially, a garnishment action is not ripe until a tort claim has been reduced to a
judgment, and then the garnishment is only proper against the
defendant against whom the judgment was obtained. Addressing
language cited by plaintiff from Jefferson Insurance Co. v. Dunn,159
that a chose in action may be subject to garnishment, the court held
such statement was mere dicta and did not apply to the facts at
60
issue."
I. Releases
In Miller v. Grand Union Co.,161 the supreme court held that neither
a covenant not to sue nor a release executed in favor of an employee
162
extinguishes a cause of action against the employee's employer,
overruling Harris v. Hanna Creative Enterprises."6 Harris held that
a release in favor of an employee foreclosed suit against an employer." ' The court in Miller wrote that under modern law, covenants not
to sue and releases have the same effect because a cause of action is
foreclosed
against only those persons actually named in the instru165
ment.

In Miller plaintiff brought claims against defendant store under the
doctrine of respondeat superior, alleging, among other things, false
imprisonment, assault, and battery committed upon plaintiff by
defendant's employee. Defendant's employee gave an affidavit favorable
to plaintiff in exchange for a covenant not to sue naming only the

157. Id. at 96-97, 513 S.E.2d at 34 (citing Superior Ins. Co. v. Dawkins, 229 Ga. App.
45, 50, 494 S.E.2d 208, 212 (1997); Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Turner, 135 Ga. App. 551,
218 S.E.2d 276 (1975)).
158. Id. at 98, 513 S.E.2d at 34 (quoting Brenau College v. Mincey, 82 Ga. App. 429,
431, 61 S.E.2d 301, 302 (1950)).
159. 224 Ga. App. 732, 482 S.E.2d 383 (1997).
160. 237 Ga. App. at 98, 513 S.E.2d at 35.
161. 270 Ga. 537, 512 S.E.2d 887 (1999).
162. Id. at 537, 512 S.E.2d at 888.
163. 208 Ga. App. 549, 430 S.E.2d 846 (1993).
164. Id. at 550, 430 S.E.2d at 847-48.
165. 270 Ga. at 538, 512 S.E.2d at 888.
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employee. The defendant-employer moved for summary judgment
arguing that under Harris the covenant not to sue extinguished any
claim plaintiff had against defendant.'6 The supreme court overruled
Harris, finding that Harris was based upon a misinterpretation of an
earlier case, 167 Posey v. Medical Center-West."6 The court found
Posey simply brought the effect of releases in line with covenants not to
sue, holding only those parties named in such instruments are protected
from suit.1" 9 Insofar as Harris had created an exception to this rule
with respect to claims based on the doctrine of respondeat superior, the
court specifically overruled the case. 7 ° Thus, the rule in Georgia is
clear: only those parties named in releases or covenants not to sue are
protected by such instruments.
The supreme court interpreted the requirement that liability insurance
proceeds be exhausted before an injured person may seek uninsured/underinsured ("UM") benefits from her own insurer in Daniels v.
Johnson.171 In that case plaintiff was injured by defendant who was
covered by a liability insurance policy with a face amount of $10,000.
Pursuant to O.C.G.A. section 33-34-3(a)(2) (Georgia's "deemer statute"),
such a policy is deemed to provide at least $15,000 in coverage, Georgia's
minimum allowable automobile liability coverage amount. 7 2 Plaintiff
settled his claim against the insurer for the stated amount of the policy
($10,000), executed a limited release as provided for in O.C.G.A. section
his claim against the UM carrier,
33-24-41. 113 in order to preserve
174
and served his UM carrier.
The supreme court held that plaintiff's settlement for the stated value
of the policy, rather than the value of the policy after application of the
deemer statute, satisfied the exhaustion requirement so plaintiff could
proceed to collect benefits from his UM provider.'75 The court further
held that a "UM carrier may plead and prove the availability of coverage
under the deemer statute and thus have its liability reduced by the
amount the plaintiff waived under that statute."176 The court also
found that permitting an insured to recover for the stated policy limits,

166.
167.
168.
169.

Id. at 537, 512 S.E.2d at 887-88.
Id. at 539, 512 S.E.2d at 889.
257 Ga. 55, 354 S.E.2d 417 (1987).
270 Ga. at 538, 512 S.E.2d at 888.

170. Id.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.

270 Ga. 289, 509 S.E.2d 41 (1998).
O.C.G.A. § 33-34-3(a)(2) (1992).
O.C.G.A. § 33-24-41.1 (1992).
270 Ga. at 289-90, 509 S.E.2d at 42-43.
Id. at 290, 509 S.E.2d at 43.
Id. at 291, 509 S.E.2d at 43.
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rather than requiring a settlement for the amount possible under the
deemer statute serves public policy and eases "both the process of
plaintiffs' 177
recovering for their injuries and the process of resolving
lawsuits."
In a special concurrence, Justices Hines and Hunstein, along with
Chief Justice Benham, wrote that because UM statutes are remedial in
nature, they should be liberally construed. 7 ' The concurrence would
have held even where a plaintiff settles for less than the stated limits of
a policy, such settlement should be deemed to satisfy the exhaustion
requirement when that settlement is made in good faith, and therefore,
the plaintiff should be permitted to proceed to seek UM benefits.'79
Such an interpretation would reduce litigation, speed the payment of
claims, and reduce the costs incurred by insureds in resolving
claims. 80 Otherwise, the concurrence wrote, requiring a plaintiff to
settle for the policy limits in order to meet the requirements for seeking
UM coverage "is in reality a call to litigate."'8 ' The majority declined
to judicially repeal the exhaustion requirement, deferring this task to
the General Assembly.8 2
J.

Default
A hotly litigated area of practice during the survey period was the law
relating to default judgments. In Roberson v. Gnann, ' 3 the court of
appeals held invalid a party's attempt to extend the time required for
filing an answer by private agreement between the parties to the suit,
when the parties did not bother to follow the rules set forth by the Civil
Practice Act.'
Specifically, the parties agreed among themselves that
defendant would not be required to file an answer until settlement
negotiations were completed, which turned out to be some five months
after the original complaint was served on defendant. The parties did
not file this agreement with the trial court, but instead, filed a series of
three stipulations in an effort to extend the time for filing the answer. s5 Each of these stipulations was untimely, however, and thus,
ineffective.8 6 The court of appeals held "[a] private agreement
177. Id. at 290, 509 S.E.2d at 43.
178. Id. at 292, 509 S.E.2d at 44 (Hines, J., concurring specially).

179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 291, 509 S.E.2d at 43.
183. 235 Ga. App. 112, 508 S.E.2d 480 (1998).

184. Id. at 115, 508 S.E.2d at 483.
185. Id. at 112, 508 S.E.2d at 481.
186. Id. at 114, 508 S.E.2d at 482.
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between counsel extending time to file pleadings is not binding except
when in compliance with [O.C.G.A. section 9-11-6(b)] and it is filed with
the court."187 According to the court, O.C.G.A. section 9-11-6(b)
188
provides for extensions of time limits set by the Civil Practice Act.
The Code section provides "'the parties, by written stipulation of counsel
filed in the action, may extend the period ...

(1) if request therefor is

made before the expiration of the period originally prescribed or as
extended by a previous order, or,'" if after the expiration of the period,
an extension may be granted by the court upon a showing that the act
was not done due to excusable neglect.'8 9
The parties had first filed a written stipulation for an extension of
time within which to file the answer, twelve days after the case had gone
into automatic default.'o After the time for filing the answer had
expired, defendant's remedy would have been either to (1) open the
default pursuant to O.C.G.A. section 9-11-55(a) because he was still
within time to open default as a matter of right, or (2) move the trial
court to grant an extension of time to file his answer by a showing of
excusable neglect under O.C.G.A. section 9-11-6(b)(2). 9' Defendant
made neither of these motions but relied upon the private agreement
with opposing counsel.' 92
The parties had privately agreed to end settlement negotiations on
October 31, 1997, and that defendant's answer would be due on
November 17, 1997, if no settlement had been reached. Accordingly,
plaintiff's attorney sent a letter to defendant on November 12, 1997,
informing defendant that if no answer was filed by November 17, 1997,
plaintiff would file a motion for default.'
The court of appeals held
the letter embodying the agreement between the parties and plaintiff's
assertion he would file a motion for default judgment were "of no legal
significance," and the letter "did not extend the statutory time required
for the filing of [defendant's] answer or serve to open the default.""9
Defendant further argued that plaintiff had waived the default by his
conduct. 9 ' The court distinguished Roberson from the cases in which

187.
188.

Id.
Id. at 113-14, 508 S.E.2d at 482.

189. Id.
190.
191.

Id. at 114, 508 S.E.2d at 482.
Id. at 114-15, 508 S.E.2d at 482-83. The Court did not address whether one of

defendant's options would have been to seek an extension on the basis of excusable neglect,
but clearly that was an option pursuant to O.C.G.A. section 9-11-6(b)(2).
192. Id. at 114, 508 S.E.2d at 482.
193. Id. at 112-13, 508 S.E.2d at 481.
194. Id. at 114, 508 S.E.2d at 482-83.
195. Id. at 115, 508 S.E.2d at 483.
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the plaintiff did not move for default until after the case had moved to
trial or appeal." The court found no waiver under the totality of the
circumstances of the case, writing "[wie will not invoke waiver against
[plaintiff] for his attempts to accommodate [defendant]." 9 7
Conversely, the court of appeals in Patel v. Gupta 9 ' reiterated the
strong policy in Georgia of deciding cases on their merits and disfavoring
the extreme sanction of imposing default on a party."9 In Patel the
court held the trial court erred when it found "'[a] default, prior to
judgment, may be opened if the Defendant has made out an extremely
good case for excusable neglect.'" 2" The court of appeals held the
proper standard required of a party in default is not an "extremely good
case" but only that a party must give a "reasonable excuse."20' The
court noted that the "'rule permitting opening of default is remedial in
nature and should be liberally applied.'"2 2 Moreover, the court wrote,
"[itis well-settled that a statute which confers discretion upon a judge
to decide a particular question also imposes a correlative duty to exercise
that discretion when the occasion arises."0 3
Likewise, the supreme court in Exxon Corp. v. Thomason,2 °4 reaffirming Georgia's disdain for default judgments, cautioned that to
establish a meritorious defense, which is a prerequisite to the opening
of default under O.C.G.A section 9-11-55(b), 205 a party need only show
that were it permitted to present a defense, the case might come out
differently than it would if the default stands. 20 6 The court held a
party seeking to open default need not show it would "completely defeat
plaintiff's claim," but only that the outcome might be different.2 7
Thus, in Thomason, when the plaintiffs had alleged in their complaint
acts sufficient to justify punitive damages, and defendants were
prepared to present evidence that the acts would not justify an

196.

Id.

197. Id.
198. 234 Ga. App. 441, 507 S.E.2d 763 (1998).
199. Id. at 443, 507 S.E.2d at 764.
200. Id. at 442, 507 S.E.2d at 764 (citing Cobb County Fair Assoc. v. Boyle, 143 Ga.
App. 754, 240 S.E.2d 136 (1977)).
201. Id. at 443, 507 S.E.2d at 765.
202. Id., 507 S.E.2d at 764 (quoting Ryles v. First Oglethorpe Co., 213 Ga. App. 327,
328, 444 S.E.2d 578, 580 (1994)).
203. Id., 507 S.E.2d at 765.
204. 269 Ga. 761, 504 S.E.2d 676 (1998).
205. O.C.G.A. § 9-11-55(b) (1993).
206. 269 Ga. at 761, 504 S.E.2d at 677.
207. Id.
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imposition of punitive damages, the court held defendants had satisfied
the requirement of showing a meritorious defense."'
The setting aside of a default after the term of court in which the
default was entered has expired is to be done only in limited circumstances. In Lee v. RestaurantManagement Services,20 9 the trial court
entered a default judgment in favor of plaintiff after defendant failed to
answer the complaint on November 19, 1996. Defendant made no
motion to the trial court until December 2, 1996, after the expiration of
the term of court. The trial court opened the judgment pursuant to its
inherent powers, finding the failure to answer "'was due to a mistake
unmixed with negligence or fault on Defendant's [] part.'"21 ° The
mistake in question was an error by defendant's insurer to hire legal
counsel and to ensure that the complaint filed by plaintiff was answered.2 '
The court of appeals reversed, holding the mistake alleged by
defendant was not unmixed with defendant's negligence because
defendant could have uncovered the mistake by a "modest follow-up"
with its insurer regarding why a complaint had not been filed on
defendant's behalf.212 Thus, the court wrote that defendant's "proper
remedy is to seek redress against its insurer" and not to have the
judgment set aside, as the defendant urged, pursuant to O.C.G.A. section
9-11-60.213
Because O.C.G.A. section 9-11-60 embodies equitable
principles, a court considering whether a party seeking relief under the
statute should be granted must determine whether a "'party, by
reasonable diligence, could have had knowledge of the truth, [and if so,]
equity shall not grant relief.'"214 Thus, without a clear showing that
a party is free from any negligence in litigating its case, a default
judgment will not be set aside after the term within which it was
granted has expired.
K

Venue
In Patterman v. Travelers, Inc.," 5 the court of appeals held the
venue provision of O.C.G.A. section 33-4-1(2) applies to any "claim [that]
arises out of [an insurer's] 'role as an insurer'" or "'business as an in-

208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.

Id. at 762, 504 S.E.2d at 678.
232 Ga. App. 902, 503 S.E.2d 59 (1998).
Id. at 903-04, 503 S.E.2d at 60 (quoting O.C.G.A. § 9-11-60(e)).
Id., 503 S.E.2d at 61.
Id. at 905, 503 S.E.2d at 61.
Id. (citing Bagwell v. Parker, 182 Ga. App. 313, 315, 355 S.E.2d 463 (1987)).
Id. at 904, 503 S.E.2d at 61 (quoting O.C.G.A. § 23-2-29 (1982)).
235 Ga. App. 784, 510 S.E.2d 307 (1998).
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surer,'" and is not limited to actions arising from an insurance contract
between the insurer and the insured.216 In Patterman plaintiffs
brought a class action suit against defendants alleging "several counts
of fraud, fraudulent inducement, negligence, racketeering, and unfair
business practices," which arose from defendant's alleged solicitation and
deceptive sales techniques to induce plaintiffs to give up existing life
insurance policies in favor of policies offered by defendants.2 17
At issue was the language of O.C.G.A. section 33-4-1 that provides
several alternative places wherein an action against an insurer may be
commenced 21" and specifically, the phrase "whenever any person shall
have a claim or demand on any insurer."219 Defendants contended
such "claim or demand" referred only to claims based on the insurance
contract itself.220 The court rejected the argument, holding no such
limitation appeared from the face of the statute and, referencing the
Insurance Code's definition of transact, wrote that it is "clear that
matters prior to the execution of an insurance contract, such as
solicitation of business and preliminary negotiations, can constitute the
business of insurance." 221 The court also noted, "nothing in the statute
indicates that it is intended [to be available only to in-state parties]."222 Thus, the court of appeals held the venue provision of
O.C.G.A section 33-4-1(2) applies to claims arising from the business
activities of an insurance company as an insurer whether before, during,
or after an insurance contract is signed.223
L.

Statute of Limitations
In Wade v. Whalen,2 4 the court of appeals reaffirmed the high
standard plaintiffs must adhere to in service of process on defendants
after the statute of limitations has expired, once it is known to a
plaintiff there is a problem with service.225 In Wade plaintiff filed a
medical malpractice action two days before the statute of limitations
expired and failed to make proper service on defendant until some eight
months after the statute of limitations had expired. Plaintiff subse-

216. Id. at 786, 510 S.E.2d at 309 (citing Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Lott, 246 Ga. 423,
423, 271 S.E.2d 833, 834 (1980)).
217. Id. at 784-85, 510 S.E.2d at 308.
218. O.C.G.A. § 33-4-1 (1992).
219. 235 Ga. App. at 785, 510 S.E.2d at 308-09.
220. Id., 510 S.E.2d at 309.
221. Id. at 787, 510 S.E.2d at 309.
222. Id. at 788, 510 S.E.2d at 310.
223. Id. at 787, 510 S.E.2d at 309.
224. 232 Ga. App. 765, 504 S.E.2d 456 (1998).
225. Id. at 766, 504 S.E.2d at 459.
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quently attempted service on defendant at an Atlanta address where
defendant had resided before moving to Texas. When the sheriff of Cobb
County, through whom plaintiff had attempted service, returned the
service form to plaintiff showing that service was unsuccessful, plaintiff
attempted service by certified mail to the Atlanta address. Although the
form provided by the post office contained an option by which a sender
could discover any forwarding address of the recipient for an additional
fee, plaintiff did not purchase the option. Thus, when the certified mail
was forwarded to defendant's new address in Texas, and plaintiff
subsequently received the certified card with defendant's signature,
plaintiff was not made aware of defendant's new address. Additionally,
plaintiff failed to take immediate steps to effect service upon defendant
after he was notified of defendant's whereabouts by a private investigator, and when he became aware of the problems in effecting service on
defendant. Instead, plaintiff tarried several days before re-attempting
service.226
The court held the duty of due diligence required of a plaintiff to effect
service after the statute of limitations has expired "is elevated to an
even higher duty of the greatest possible diligence once plaintiff becomes
aware there is a problem with service."227 Once a sheriff returns the
service form showing service cannot be made, "'reasonable diligence' is
insufficient." 2' The court wrote "'[tihe burden is on the plaintiff to
ascertain a defendant's residence,'" both before and after filing suit, and
"[p]laintiff
is obligated to ascertain this information before filing
" 229
suit.

The special concurrence in Wade stated that it would reserve the
higher duty of "'the greatest possible diligence"' for cases wherein a
response asserting the defense had been filed. 23" The special concurrence pointed out that only imposing the higher duty on plaintiffs who
are made aware there is a problem with service by the sheriff "creates
an illogical distinction" because "[many plaintiffs are aware that there
is a problem with service, despite the fact that the sheriff has not so
indicated on a return of service." 231 Further, the concurring opinion

226. Id. at 766-68, 504 S.E.2d at 459-60.
227. Id. at 766, 504 S.E.2d at 459.
228. Id. (citing Sykes v. Springer, 220 Ga. App. 388, 390, 469 S.E.2d 472, 474-75
(1996)).
229. Id. at 768, 504 S.E.2d at 460.
230. Id. at 770-71, 504 S.E.2d at 462 (Pope, P.J., concurring specially) (quoting Roberts
v. Bienert, 183 Ga. App. 751, 752, 360 S.E.2d 25, 26 (1987)).
231. Id. at 772, 504 S.E.2d at 463.
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pointed out the dearth of Georgia Supreme Court precedent holding a
plaintiff to a standard beyond due diligence.232
In Hunter, Maclean, Exley & Dunn, PC. v. Frame,"' the court
addressed O.C.G.A. section 9-3-96, which provides for the tolling of the
statute of limitations where a plaintiff is prevented from bringing a
claim by the fraud of the defendant.2" In Frame plaintiff was represented by defendant law firm in connection with the sale of plaintiff's
Some material omissions were made in the closing
corporation.
documents. Plaintiff was subsequently sued and held liable for the
omissions by his buyer and as a result filed suit against his lawyer, yet
outside the statute of limitations.2"5 The supreme court held the mere
fact that a confidential relationship exists between parties, standing
alone, is not sufficient to toll the statute of limitations pursuant to
O.C.G.A. section 9-3-36.236
A plaintiff must establish three elements to toll the statute of
limitations, pursuant to O.C.G.A. section 9-3-96:
(1) actual fraud involving moral turpitude on the part of the defendant;
(2) the fraud must conceal the existence of the cause of action from the
plaintiff, thereby debarring or deterring the knowing of the cause of
action; and (3) plaintiff exercised reasonable diligence to discover the
cause of action, notwithstanding the failure to discover within the
statute of limitation."?
The court in Frame reaffirmed that plaintiffs who are aggrieved by
persons in a confidential relationship are not relieved of establishing the
fraudulent intent of a defendant in order to toll the statute of limitations.2' The court held that before the statute of limitations will be
tolled for fraud, a plaintiff must show an intention by the defendant to
conceal or deceive the plaintiff and as a result, that plaintiff was
deterred from bringing his or her suit. 239 The supreme court explained
that the existence of a confidential relationship places a higher burden

232. Id. at 771, 504 S.E.2d at 462. Judge Pope cited Poloney v. Tambrands, Inc., 260
Ga. 850,412 S.E.2d 526 (1991) and Georgia Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Co. v. Kilgore,
265 Ga. 836, 462 S.E.2d 713 (1995), wherein the supreme court only required a plaintiff

exercise due diligence in effecting service of process. Id.
233. 269 Ga. 844, 507 S.E.2d 411 (1998).
234. O.C.G.A. § 9-3-96 (1982).
235. 269 Ga. at 845, 507 S.E.2d at 412.
236. Id. at 847-48, 507 S.E.2d at 414.
237. Charter Peachford Behavioral Health Sys., Inc. v. Kohout, 233 Ga. App. 452, 457,
504 S.E.2d 514, 522 (citing Jim Walter Corp. v. Ward, 245 Ga. 355, 265 S.E.2d 7 (1980)).
238. 269 Ga. at 847, 507 S.E.2d at 413-14.
239. Id. at 849, 507 S.E.2d at 415.
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upon a defendant to disclose the existence of fraud and a lower duty
upon a plaintiff to discover such fraud.2" Nonetheless, a plaintiff
must still show a defendant's fraudulent intent to preclude a plaintiff
from bringing a suit within the statute of limitations.2 4' Thus, the
existence of a confidential relationship "affects only the extent of (a) the
defendant's duty to reveal fraud, and (b) the
242 plaintiff's corresponding
obligation to discover the fraud for herself."
M. PleadingPractice
The Georgia Court of Appeals decided several cases addressing the
technicalities of pleading practice. In McCormick v. Acree,2 3 the court
of appeals addressed the issue of whether a complaint was void or
merely voidable when it was signed by a lawyer who was not in good
standing with the State Bar of Georgia. Plaintiffs filed their complaint
on December 15, 1992, which bore the signature of their lawyer who had
not paid his bar dues at the time he signed the complaint and, therefore,
was not a member in good standing of the State Bar of Georgia.
Thereafter, plaintiffs amended their complaint, adding the name of an
attorney who was a member in good standing at the time the complaint
was filed. Three years later, defendants filed a motion to dismiss,
arguing plaintiffs' complaint was void because the attorney who signed
the original complaint was not a member in good standing when the
complaint was filed. The trial court granted the motion, finding that
because the complaint was not filed in accordance with O.C.G.A. section
9-11-11(a), it was void and a nullity and could not be amended. 2"
The court of appeals disagreed with the trial court and reversed,
holding the complaint was merely voidable and could be amended to cure
the defect.2 45 Recognizing that O.C.G.A. section 9-11-11(a) requires
that all pleadings be signed by either the party, if not represented by an
attorney, or by at least one attorney of record if represented, the court
of appeals liberally construed O.C.G.A. section 9-11-15(a) to allow
amendment of pleadings without leave of the court prior to the entry of
a pretrial order. 2 6 Because plaintiffs had amended their complaint to
include the signature of an attorney in good standing prior to the entry

240.
241.

Id.
Id.

242. Id. at 848, 507 S.E.2d at 414.
243. 232 Ga. App. 834, 503 S.E.2d 88 (1998).
244. Id. at 834-35, 503 S.E.2d at 89.
245. Id. at 836, 503 S.E.2d at 89-90.
246. Id., 503 S.E.2d at 89. The court relied on Bandy v. HospitalAuthority of Walker
County, 174 Ga. App. 556, 332 S.E.2d 46 (1985) in deciding the present case. 232 Ga. App.
at 835-36, 503 S.E.2d at 89.
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of the pretrial order, the trial court erred in dismissing the complaint.247
In McCombs v. Southern Regional Medical Center, Inc.,24 the court
of appeals addressed the issue of whether the answer of one defendant
was filed on behalf of four alleged corporate defendants. Plaintiff in
McCombs had undergone spinal surgery which involved the installation
of a plate device. The plate system was manufactured by Synthes
(U.S.A.). After experiencing problems, plaintiff instituted a products
liability action against Defendants Synthes, Inc., Synthes North
America, Inc., Synthes Ltd., U.S.A., Synthes Spine Company, L.P., a/k/a
Synthes Spine Company L.P., and Synthes (U.S.A.), a/k/a Synthes,
2 49 Each of the named defendants was a separate legal entiU.S.A.
2 5°
ty.

One answer was filed in response to plaintiff's complaint-the answer
of Defendant Synthes Spine Company L.P. Plaintiff moved for entry of
default against three of the Synthes defendants because they failed to
timely file an answer. The trial court denied that motion, finding that
the first paragraph of the answer was the joint answer of all Synthes
entities. 251' The court of appeals reversed, finding the answer was
made on behalf of only one Synthes defendant. 5 2
In analyzing the pleading, the court looked first at what the pleading
itself said it was: "Answer of Defendant Synthes Spine Company
L.P."' s The court noted the caption reflected that the answer was
that of only one defendant, and the opening paragraph referred to that
single defendant. 2 4 The first paragraph of the complaint averred that
defendant had been improperly named as the other listed Synthes
defendants and averred that the other Synthes defendants did not
market, manufacture, or distribute the product at issue; the complaint
should be dismissed as to those four entities. The trial court determined
that the first paragraph, but not the remainder of the pleading, was the
joint answer of all of the named defendants. 25 5 However, the court of
appeals disagreed with the trial court that such language in one

247.
248.
249.
250.
251.

232 Ga. App. at 836, 503 S.E.2d at 89-90.
233 Ga. App. 676, 504 S.E.2d 747 (1998).
Id. at 676, 504 S.E.2d at 749.
Id. at 677-78, 504 S.E.2d at 749.
Id. at 679, 504 S.E.2d at 751.

252. Id. at 681-82, 504 S.E.2d at 752.
253. Id. at 679, 504 S.E.2d at 750. The court noted: "'It is usually informative, in
determining what a pleading is, to look at what the pleader says it is.'" Id. (quoting Cato
Oil Co. v. Lewis, 250 Ga. 24, 26, 295 S.E.2d 527 (1982)).
254. Id.
255. Id.
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paragraph constituted the answer of those entities.256 The court stated
it was unreasonable to examine one paragraph out of the entire answer
in isolation and concluded it was intended to be the pleading of all the
defendants but that the remainder of the answer was intended to be the
answer of only one defendant.257
The court of appeals also found compelling the fact that the attorneys
signing the answer identified themselves as representatives for only
Synthes Spine Company, L.P., and not the other Synthes entities.258
Because the other Synthes defendants were separate legal entities, the
court held they could not benefit from the answer filed solely by one
Synthes defendant." 9 Having filed no answer, those defendants were
in default.2 °
The court of appeals gave some guidance during the survey period on
the issue of compulsory counterclaims in the case of Bigley v. Mosser, 26 1 a libel action. Under O.C.G.A. section 9-11-13(a), if a claim
arises out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of
the opposing party's claim, such claim must be asserted as a compulsory
counterclaim. 2 2 Georgia courts have interpreted the "same transaction or occurrence" requirement to mean "whether or not there exists
a
2
logical relationship between the respective claims of the parties." 1
In Bigley plaintiffs sued defendant Mosser for libel. Mosser had
previously sued plaintiffs for libel. The underlying events of both sets
of lawsuits involved the management of a homeowner association and
election to the association's board of directors. The first lawsuit,
instituted by Mosser, alleged plaintiffs distributed a flyer during the
election which contained libelous statements about Mosser. Plaintiffs
did not assert counterclaims against Mosser in those actions. The
instant lawsuit brought by plaintiffs against Mosser alleged Mosser
made libelous statements about them in a newsletter distributed during
the same election. Mosser moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing
plaintiffs should have asserted their claims as compulsory counterclaims
in her prior cases. The trial court granted the motion, finding that there

256. Id. at 681, 504 S.E.2d at 752.
257. Id.
258.
259.

Id. at 679-80, 504 S.E.2d at 751.
Id. at 677, 504 S.E.2d at 749.

260. Id. at 681-82, 504 S.E.2d at 752.
261. 235 Ga. App. 583, 509 S.E.2d 406 (1998).
262. O.C.G.A. § 9-11-13(a) (1993).
263. 235 Ga. App. at 583, 509 S.E.2d at 406 (citing Aycock v. Calk, 228 Ga. App. 172,
174, 491 S.E.2d 383 (1997)).
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was a logical relationship between the claims because they all arose out
of the disputed board election. 2"
The Georgia Court of Appeals noted that while Georgia courts have
applied the logical relationship test, they have not set forth factors to
consider in determining whether such a relationship exists.2" 5 "Clearly, the mere fact that some tangential relationship may be articulated
between two claims is not sufficient to find them 'logically related' for
purposes of the compulsory counterclaim statute."2 6 The court looked
to federal court analysis of the logical relationship test, finding that "a
'logical relationship ... arises (1) when the same aggregate or operative
facts serve[] as the basis for both claims; or (2) the case facts supporting
the original claim activate[] legal rights of the defendant that would
otherwise remain dormant.'" 267 The court noted the "logical relationship test requires a determination of 'whether the essential facts of the
various claims are so logically connected that considerations of judicial
economy and fairness dictate that all the issues be resolved in one
lawsuit.'" 2" The question boils down to whether the facts in the main
claim and counterclaim are both "common" and "operative."269
In the present case, the Georgia Court of Appeals found that, although
the board election was common to both actions, the election itself was
not the operative fact upon which all the various claims were based.
Each claim was based on a different statement, made at a different time
and in a different publication.27 1 Because the "success or failure of the
various claims will depend upon whether each particular statement was
false and defamatory," the fact that the statements were all made in the
context of a board election was not significant to the resolution of
The acts were not "logically related" because they were
claims. 2
based on separate and distinct occurrences of alleged libel; each
individual statement, and its truth or falsity, constituted the subject
matter of each claim.273
The court noted that, to the contrary, cases in which a logical
relationship has been found have generally focused on claims arising out

264. Id. at 584-85, 509 S.E.2d at 407.
265. Id. at 585, 509 S.E.2d at 408.
266. Id.
267. Id. (quoting Majik Market v. Best, 684 F. Supp. 1089, 1090 (N.D. Ga. 1987)).
268. Id. at 585-86, 509 S.E.2d at 408 (quoting Blue Dane Simmental Corp. v. American

Simmental Ass'n, 952 F. Supp. 1399, 1410 (D. Neb. 1997)).
269. Id. at 586, 509 S.E.2d at 408.
270. Id.
271. Id.
272. Id., 509 S.E.2d at 408-09.
273. Id. at 587, 509 S.E.2d at 409.
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of the same basic dispute or the same contractual relationship between
the parties." 4 In Bigley the court held plaintiffs' claims were not
compulsory counterclaims, because the common thread-the election-was not the operative fact underlying all the various claims. 5
N. PersonalJurisdiction
Of much practical significance in the realm of personal jurisdiction is
the case of Escareno v. Carl Nolte Sohne GmbH,276 decided by the
Georgia Supreme Court on a question certified by the United States
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit.2 7 The question certified
was whether the appointment of an administrator for Alejandro
Escareno's estate was proper, based upon a pending cause of action in
Fulton County against Carl Nolte Sohne GmbH, a foreign defendant, or
upon the 8presence of the case file in decedent's counsel's office in Fulton
27

County.

While working in Georgia, decedent Escareno suffered third degree
burns when a crucible allegedly manufactured by Carl Nolte Sohn, a
German company, burst and showered him with molten zinc. Escareno
filed a diversity suit against Carl Nolte Sohn and others in the Federal
District Court for the Northern District of Georgia. Escareno died later
the same year while he was a resident in Mexico. He left no property in
Georgia other than his interest in the lawsuit and the file in his lawyer's
possession. His lawyer was appointed temporary administrator of the
estate and sought to substitute himself as a party plaintiff. The district
court denied the substitution and dismissed the case. The Eleventh
Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and remanded. On remand, Escareno's lawyer petitioned the Fulton County Probate Court for the appointment of an administrator of the estate, which was granted. The
administrator then sought substitution as plaintiff, and the federal
district court again dismissed the suit, holding the probate court in
Fulton County lacked jurisdiction under O.C.G.A. section 15-9-31 to
appoint an administrator because Escareno, a resident of Mexico, did not
County or a cause of action against a Fulton
have property in7 Fulton
9
County resident.

The Georgia Supreme Court analyzed the Georgia statutes addressing
the jurisdiction of a probate court over the estate of a nonresident:

274. Id.

275. Id. at 588, 509 S.E.2d at 410.
276.

270 Ga. 264, 507 S.E.2d 743 (1998).

277. 139 F.3d 1456 (11th Cir. 1998).
278. 270 Ga. at 264, 507 S.E.2d at 743.
279. Id. at 264-65, 507 S.E.2d at 743-44.
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O.C.G.A. sections 15-9-32, 15-9-31(2), and 53-6-21.280 The supreme
court found those laws "evidence an intent for the situs of the estate to
follow the location of the cause of action." 81 The supreme court held
that reading the provisions together "demonstrates that the pendency of
a nonresident decedent's lawsuit in a county is a sufficient basis for the
administration of the estate in that county."2 2 The court concluded
the appointment of an administrator for Escareno's estate in Fulton
County, where the lawsuit was pending, was proper. 3 To hold, as
defendant argued, that a "cause of action is sufficient only if it is against
a resident of the county in which it is brought" would have the result
terminating a pending lawsuit on the nonresident's death, even if
defendant's negligence caused the death. 28 4 The Georgia Supreme
Court declined to allow such an unjust result.
III.

LEGISLATION

Governor Barnes signed a bill which purports to extinguish the age-old
problem of "vanishing venue." While the problem may still exist with
regard to cases filed before July 1, 1999, the legislation eliminates this
inefficiency in those cases filed on or after July 1, 1999. Under O.C.G.A.
section 9-10-31,2s5 prior to its amendment, when multiple defendants
were sued, some being residents of different counties, vanishing venue
often posed a significant problem. For example, two defendants, A and
B, could be sued in any county in which either defendant was a resident.
However, if suit was brought against defendants A and B in A's home
county, and defendant A was subsequently discharged from liability,
venue would immediately vanish as to defendant B. This vanishing act,
unfortunately, required transfer of the case to B's county of residence
and a new trial.288

280. Id. at 265, 507 S.E.2d at 744. O.C.G.A. section 15-9-32 provides that "[w]hen a
nonresident decedent has property or a cause of action in more than one county, letters of
administration may be granted in any county in which such property or cause of action is
located." O.C.G.A. section 15-9-31(2) provides that a probate court can grant administration of the estate of a nonresident person "with a bona fide cause of action against some
person therein." And O.C.G.A. section 53-6-21 provides that "application for letters of
administration of a nonresident's estate shall be made in a county where some portion of
the estate is located."

281.
282.
283.
284.
285.
286.

270 Ga. at 265, 507 S.E.2d at 744.
Id.
Id. at 266, 507 S.E.2d at 744.
Id.
O.C.G.A. § 9-10-31 (1982).
Id.
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Under the amended statute the problem is resolved.8 7 The changes
to the statute provide first that, prior to the commencement of the trial,
if "the court determines ...[t]he plaintiff has brought the action in bad
faith against all defendants residing in the county in which the action
is brought" or if "as a matter of law, no defendant residing in the county
in which the action is brought is a proper party," the action is to be
transferred to a county where venue is proper.2"' The plaintiff shall
have the right to choose among venues if more than one proper venue
exists. 28 9 The statute places the burden of proving that transfer is
appropriate on the complaining party.2"
The statute also provides that if a defendant whose residence is
required for venue in a particular county is "discharged from liability
before the commencement of trial," the remaining defendant(s) may
require transfer of the case to a proper venue.291 Where venue is
proper in several counties, the plaintiff
again may choose to which
92
county the case will be transferred.
Lastly, and perhaps most significantly, the statute provides that where
"all defendants who reside in the county in which an action is pending
are discharged from liability after the commencement of trial," venue
may be transferred only if all parties consent to the transfer. 293 The
statute provides that a trial is commenced when the jury in a jury trial
is sworn or when the first witness is sworn in a bench trial.2"
The statute strikes a fair balance between practical efficiency and the
rights of defendants to be sued in their county of residence under the
Georgia Constitution. Section 2 of the statute enunciates the purpose of
the amendments: "to provide for a fairer and more predictable rule of
venue [and] to eliminate the waste of time and resources to courts and
parties under the vanishing venue doctrine."295
IV. CONCLUSION

As is true year after year, the cases decided during the survey period
did not settle all potential issues, leaving plenty of room for new
interpretation in subsequent survey periods. While this survey is not
intended to be exhaustive, it seeks to address the more notable
287.

Id. § 9-10-31 (Supp. 1999).

288. Id. § 9-10-31(a).
289. Id.
290. Id.
291.

Id. § 9-10-31(b) (emphasis added).

292. Id.
293. Id. § 9-10-31(c) (emphasis added).
294. Id. § 9-10-31(d).
295. 1991 Ga. Laws 746.
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substantive and practical developments. The authors hope the readers
find this material useful in staying abreast of recent developments in
trial practice and procedure.

